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NOTE 
RECLASSIFYING BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS:  
WHO CARES WHAT CONGRESS WANTS ANYWAY? 
Jeremy D. Lemon† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is the single greatest communication invention of our time.1 
It allows instantaneous communication through a broad array of networks 
all over the world, providing an immense amount of information at the 
users’ fingertips. After the first commercial web browser became available 
to the consumer market in 1993, the Internet, in a few short years, 
revolutionized modern day communication.2 It drastically changed 
mankind’s methods of communication so much that it makes one shudder 
to imagine a world without the Internet. Our dependence on the Internet is 
ever-increasing as the commercial, educational, and social benefits received 
from the Internet are recognized.3 Companies rely on Internet websites to 
sell their products, and many teachers now post homework assignments 
online for their students.4 In fact, students regularly consult Internet 
websites to access information necessary for school projects, papers, and 
assignments, as well as for entertainment purposes. Socially, many websites 
such as Facebook, Myspace, and Twitter allow users to post a personal 
profile to establish and maintain consistent contact with other users all 
across the world. Instant messaging capabilities allow users to 
instantaneously communicate by typing messages to another user.5 Also, 
instant communication software—such as Skype—allows users to video 
chat through the Internet, and websites such as YouTube allow users to post 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Articles and Book Reviews Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW; J.D. Candidate 
(2012), Liberty University School of Law; B.S. Government: Politics and Policy (2009), 
Liberty University. I would like to thank my parents, Rob and Anita Lemon, for their 
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 1. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 4 (FCC, Working Paper 
No. 31, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. See BLACKBOARD, http://www.blackboard.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).  
 5. See AOL, http://www.aim.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).  
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videos to provide entertainment and education.6 In short, the Internet has 
made available a vast new world of endless information through 
instantaneous communication.  
The success and innovation of the Internet are often attributed to the 
“market forces, investment, and competition that have driven its growth.”7 
These three components are made possible by the openness that has defined 
the Internet throughout its development.8 Congress and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) preserved the Internet’s openness 
through their policy of generally not regulating Internet access.9 Even the 
FCC’s chairman recognized that this was “‘the best decision [the] 
government ever made with respect to the Internet.’”10 This policy of 
Internet openness has led to great innovation and relatively inexpensive 
access to the Internet.11  
Despite the benefits and success of non-regulatory policies, the FCC 
recently proposed a new regulatory scheme for the Internet after having its 
jurisdiction challenged in court.12 In April 2010, in Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 
the D.C. Court of Appeals confused the FCC as to the FCC’s jurisdictional 
reach delegated by Congress.13 In the aftermath of this case, the FCC 
proposed subjecting broadband Internet access to mandatory and broad 
regulation by reclassifying Internet access from an information service to a 
telecommunications service.14  
                                                                                                                                      
 6. See SKYPE, http://www.skype.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011); YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
 7. Oxman, supra note 1, at 5.  
 8. Id.  
 9. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006); In re 
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (2005) [hereinafter Policy Statement].  
 10. Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, ATT.COM 1 (Jan. 14, 2010), 
http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/public_policy/AT&TNet_Neutrality_Comments1_
14_09.pdf. 
 11. Oxman, supra note 1, at 5. 
 12. In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, 75 Fed. Reg. 36071-01 para. 1-2 
(June 24, 2010) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry].  
 13. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the FCC 
“failed to tie its assertion of ancillary authority over Comcast’s Internet service to any 
‘statutorily mandated responsibility’”). 
 14. See discussion infra Part II. 
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In the Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”)15 and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecommuniations Act”),16 Congress 
delegated to the FCC the regulatory framework to impose regulations on 
different types of communications.17 This regulatory framework is quite 
extensive and far-reaching and to this point has only been minimally 
applied to the Internet. This Note proposes that subjecting broadband 
Internet access18 to further regulations under Title II of the 
Communications Act of 1934 violates the FCC’s jurisdictional reach 
prescribed by Congress.19 Section II reviews the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and provides a 
thorough discussion of the regulatory framework mandated by Congress, as 
well as the historical underpinnings of the framework. Section III addresses 
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, the controlling case that created uncertainty 
regarding the FCC’s jurisdiction over the Internet. Section III also explains 
the measures proposed by the FCC to resolve the jurisdictional issue and 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s process for holding agency actions 
adverse to Congress’s delegated authority. Section IV argues that subjecting 
broadband Internet access providers or any component of a provider’s 
service to regulation under Title II of the Communications Act violates the 
text and congressional intent of the Act as amended.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Current Classification Framework of Communications 
Through the Communications Act of 1934, Congress established the 
FCC “for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 
communication by wire and radio” to make “Nation-wide, and world-wide 
                                                                                                                                      
 15. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 16. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 17. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614.  
 18. Broadband Internet access refers “to the bundle of services that facilities-based 
providers sell to end users in the retail market. This bundle allows end users to connect to 
the Internet, and often includes other services such as e-mail and online storage.” Notice of 
Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1 n.1. 
 19. This Note does not address every facet of the Internet and all its capabilities. Instead, 
this Note addresses whether the FCC may regulate broadband Internet access. The term 
“Internet service providers” (ISPs) may be used interchangeably with “broadband Internet 
access providers.”  
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wire and radio communication service” 20 available to everyone in the 
United States. When the Communications Act took force, the only 
communications that the FCC was empowered to regulate were 
telecommunications and radio broadcasts.21  
As technology progressed, updates to this area of the law became 
necessary.22 Congress supplemented the Communications Act by 
implementing the Telecommunications Act, which was enacted “for the 
express purposes of promoting competition, reducing regulation, and 
encouraging the rapid deployment of new telecommunications 
technologies.”23 In the Telecommunications Act, Congress expressed its 
policy concerning the Internet as a desire “to promote the continued 
development of the Internet”24 and “to preserve the vibrant and competitive 
free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation.”25 In 2005, the FCC declared its own policy regarding the 
Internet as the desire to offer “guidance and insight into [the FCC’s] 
approach to the Internet and broadband that is consistent with these 
Congressional [sic] directives.”26 In this official Policy Statement, the FCC 
adopted certain principles “[t]o encourage broadband deployment and 
preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public 
Internet . . . .”27 
In the Telecommunications Act, Congress provided for two separate 
categories of regulation: “telecommunications carriers and information 
service providers.”28 This distinction is crucial because 
“telecommunications carriers” are subject to broad regulation as common 
carriers under Title II of the Act,29 but “information service providers” are 
                                                                                                                                      
 20. 47 U.S.C. § 151.  
 21. See MAX D. PAGLIN, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 
3-5 (1989).  
 22. SHARON K. BLACK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 1-9 (2002).  
 23. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,856 n.8 (2005) (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
U.S.C.)) [hereinafter Report and Order]. 
 24. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).  
 25. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
 26. Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 14,987 para. 3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005). 
 29. 47 U.S.C. § 153(44). 
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not common carriers and are regulated with only a light touch under Title 
I.30 
1.  Telecommunications Carriers 
A telecommunications carrier is “any provider of telecommunications 
services,”31 which is defined as “the offering of telecommunications for a fee 
directly to the public.”32 Telecommunications itself is the “transmission, 
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s 
choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent 
and received.”33 Under the Telecommunications Act, telecommunications 
carriers are classified as common carriers,34 which are subject to broad 
regulation under Title II of the Telecommunications Act.35 
Telecommunications historically encompassed telephone, telegraph, and 
cable services.36 Under Title II, common carriers must charge just and 
reasonable rates, have nondiscriminatory policies, defer to hearings 
concerning alleged lawlessness, and file certain contracts with the FCC.37 
Such regulations are mandatory, but the FCC must forbear from regulating 
if “the public interest requires it.”38  
                                                                                                                                      
 30. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976. 
 31. 47 U.S.C. § 153(44). 
 32. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46).  
 33. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). For this definition, think of a telephone. The telephone 
transports a message to a specific point of the caller’s choosing, while the content and form 
of the message do not change. For example, the caller speaks into the telephone, and the 
receiver is able to hear the speaker’s communication because the form and content of the 
communication are the same as when sent by the speaker. 
 34. 47 U.S.C. § 153(10). This section defines a “common carrier” or “carrier” as 
any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign 
communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission 
of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to 
this chapter; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as 
such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier. 
Id.  
 35. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976; see also Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 
153(44) (2006); Communications Act of 1934 § 201, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).  
 36. See PAGLIN, supra note 21, at 27-30, 30 n.40.  
 37. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276. 
 38. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976. 
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2.  Information Services 
Information services are not subject to common carrier regulation under 
Title II as common carriers; instead, information services are subject to the 
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction found in Title I.39 Section 4(i) in Title I of the 
Communications Act provides that “[t]he Commission may perform any 
and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not 
inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its 
functions.”40 Traditionally, this ancillary jurisdiction vests the FCC with 
power to lightly regulate information services to the extent that the FCC 
acts pursuant to an authority-granting provision under Title I, and that the 
regulation is “reasonably ancillary to the [FCC’s] effective performance of 
its statutorily mandated responsibilities.”41 This provision was the issue at 
the center of Comcast Corp. v. FCC,42 discussed in detail in Part IIIA, infra.  
The FCC does wield some regulatory authority over information 
services, which is defined by Congress in the Telecommunications Act.43 
According to the Telecommunications Act, an information service is “the 
offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, 
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications”44 This definition focuses primarily on the capacity or 
ability to process information, as opposed to the actual means of merely 
transporting the information.45 An information service processes 
information and may use a telecommunication’s means to actually deliver 
the information to the user. An information service is still properly defined 
as an information service, even if it has an integrated telecommunications 
component.46    
                                                                                                                                      
 39. Id. 
 40. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).  
 41. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644-46 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 42. Id. at 642. 
 43. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975-76.  
 44. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).  
 45. Id. The means of transporting information, on the other hand, is the primary focus 
of the definition of telecommunications: “‘telecommunications’ means the transmission, 
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, 
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 153(43). 
 46. In re Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,539 para. 80 
(1998) (report to Congress) [hereinafter Universal Service Report]. 
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B.  The Historical Origins of the Classification Framework 
This dichotomy47 between telecommunications carriers and information 
services originated in the 1960s and continued to develop through the mid-
1980s in the Computer Inquiry Proceedings.48 These proceedings constitute 
three different sets of FCC regulations and declarations: Computer I, II, and 
III.49  
In 1970, the FCC issued Computer I to address company’s processing 
and storing public data.50 In 1970, data processing meant the “‘use of a 
computer for the processing of information as distinguished from circuit or 
message-switching.’”51 To promote innovation and competition in the data 
processing market, the FCC decided not to claim broad regulatory authority 
over data processing services, thereby treating them differently than other 
regulated communications services.52 Instead of imposing broad regulation 
over data processing, the FCC determined that it would make the necessary 
classification on a case-by-case basis for those services that combined 
communications and data processing functions.53 While implementing this 
regulation, however, the FCC realized that a case-by-case determination 
would simply not suffice in light of new technological advances.54  
In response to the problems arising under Computer I, the FCC issued 
Computer II in 1980.55 In Computer II, the FCC distinguished between 
“basic services” and “enhanced services.”56 It defined basic service as the 
offering of “a pure transmission capability over a communications path that 
                                                                                                                                      
 47. Id. at 11,520 para. 39. This classification system is properly referred to as a 
dichotomy because of Congress’s desire that the categories be mutually exclusive as 
discussed in Part IV infra.  
 48. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976; accord Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,866 para. 21. 
 49. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of 
Computer and Commc’n Servs. and Facilities, 28 F.C.C. 2d 291 (1970) [hereinafter 
Computer I]; In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rule and Regulations, 77 
F.C.C. 2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II]; In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the 
Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C. 2d 958 (1986) 
[hereinafter Computer III]. 
 50. Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,867 para. 22. 
 51. Id. at 14,867 n.55 (quoting Computer I, supra note 49, at 295 para. 15). 
 52. Id. at 14,867 para. 22.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 14,867 para. 23. 
 55. Computer II, supra note 49.  
 56. Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,867 para. 23 (citing Computer II, supra note 
49, at 435 para. 132). 
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is virtually transparent in terms of its interactions with customer supplied 
information.”57 On the other hand, it characterized enhanced service as 
“any offering over the telecommunications network which is more than a 
basic transmission service.”58 In this ruling, the FCC subjected basic services 
to regulation as a common carrier under Title II of the Communications 
Act.59 Computer II did not treat enhanced services as common carriers; 
thus, enhanced services were not subject to broad regulation under Title II, 
but were only subject to the light regulatory touch of the FCC’s ancillary 
jurisdiction under Title I.60 The FCC believed this approach to be 
appropriate because heavy common carrier regulation under Title II would 
impede further innovation and betray the congressional policy of the 
Communications Act.61 The FCC declared that even though enhanced 
service has a telecommunications component, the primary purpose of such 
service is data processing, which has never been regulated under Title II.62 
Furthermore, the FCC believed that not subjecting enhanced service to 
common carrier regulation under Title II was consistent with Congress’s 
statutory objectives of promoting nation-wide communications service.63 In 
this proceeding, however, the FCC did require enhanced services that 
owned their own transmission facilities to lease their local transmission 
lines to other enhanced services on a common carrier basis at the same 
prices, terms, and conditions.64 This requirement has never applied to 
enhanced services that did not own their own transmission lines, and the 
requirement did not have an effect on the services offered to the public.65 In 
Computer III, the FCC continued to distinguish basic services from 
enhanced services under the same basic framework.66 
                                                                                                                                      
 57. Computer II, supra note 49, at 420 para. 96. 
 58. Id. at 420 para. 97.  
 59. Id. at 419 para. 92.  
 60. Id. at 435 para. 132.  
 61. Id. at 434 para. 129.  
 62. Id. at 435 para. 132.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 474 para. 231. 
 65. Letter from Robert M. McDowell, Comm’r, FCC, to Henry A. Waxman, 
Representative, United States House of Representatives 1 (May 5, 2010), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297934A1.pdf.  
 66. Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,869 para. 26.  
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When Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, it 
maintained and integrated the same basic dichotomy.67 Thus, basic 
services—like telecommunications services—are regulated as common 
carriers, whereas enhanced services—like information services—are 
regulated under the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction in Title I.68  
C.  Classification of Internet Access as an Information Service 
Before Internet access services can be properly classified, it is important 
to understand how the Internet is accessed. There are two ways to access the 
Internet: the traditional dial-up method and broadband Internet service.69 
The dial-up method, which is very slow, uses local telephone companies’ 
facilities to make “calls with computer modems through the telephone 
wires.”70 Broadband Internet service, commonly referred to as high-speed 
Internet, is the most common mode of Internet access today.71 Broadband 
Internet service comes in a variety of ways: cable modem service that uses 
cable lines owned by the cable companies to transmit data between the 
Internet and users, digital subscriber line (DSL) that uses telephone lines 
owned by local telephone companies,72 broadband over power lines,73 and 
wireless broadband.74  
There are two components of broadband Internet access: a 
telecommunications component and an information service component.75 
To determine how the Internet should be classified for regulatory purposes, 
the FCC examined the Telecommunications Act and considered Congress’s 
intent surrounding the Act, the legislative history of the Act, and the text of 
the Act itself.76 With this background in mind, in 1998, the FCC declared in 
its Universal Service Report77 that Internet access services were properly 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. Id. at 14,871 para. 29. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974-75 
(2005).  
 70. Id.  
 71. See id. at 967.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Letter from Robert M. McDowell to Henry A. Waxman, supra note 65, at 3. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 978-80.  
 76. Id. at 978-79; see also Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,539-40 para. 80.  
 77. The Universal Service Report was a report to Congress by the FCC: “On November 
26, 1997, in a recent Appropriations Act, Congress directed the Commission to report to 
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classified as information services, and should therefore be governed under 
Title I of the Act.78 By evaluating the legislative history of the Act, the FCC 
concluded that Congress intended to keep the Computer II framework and 
to keep the Internet generally unregulated, but not under Title II.79 
Moreover, the FCC determined that it was Congress’s intent to make the 
                                                                                                                                      
Congress on the Commission’s implementation of certain provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 regarding the universal service system.” Universal Service 
Report, supra note 46, at 11,502-03 para. 1. This report states that 
the Appropriations Act requires the Commission to submit a report to 
Congress . . . providing: a detailed description of the extent to which the 
Commission’s interpretations . . . are consistent with the plain language of the 
Communications Act of 1934 . . . as amended by the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, and shall include a review of—(1) the definitions of “information 
service” . . . “telecommunications service” . . . and the impact of the 
Commission’s interpretation of those definitions on the current and future 
provision of universal service to consumers in all areas of the Nation . . . .  
Id. at 11,502 n.1. 
 78. Id. at 11,527 para. 52.  
 79. Id. at 11,524 para. 45 (quoting Letter from Senator McCain at 1) (“Senator McCain 
urges that Congress [never] intended to subject information services providers to the current 
regulatory scheme applicable to common carriers . . . .”). Proponents of broadband Internet 
access reclassification  
claim that, until 2005, Internet access services had always been regulated as 
Title II telecommunications services as a result of the Commission’s Computer 
Inquiry rules. That view illogically conflates two distinct issues: the threshold 
classification of a retail communications service as either an “information 
service” or a “telecommunications service,” and the regulatory consequences 
that the legacy Computer Inquiry rules attached to services classified as 
“information services.” Those rules, which applied only to wireline common 
carriers (and not cable modem service providers or wireless broadband 
providers), did not affect the classification of retail Internet access service as an 
information service. Instead, those rules required carriers offering Internet 
access services to also separately offer the transmission component of their 
Internet access services as a wholesale telecommunications service pursuant to 
tariff. . . . And while the Computer Inquiry rules may have served the 
Commission’s policy goals in the narrowband, circuit-switched “one-wire 
world” for which they were initially created 40 years ago, they would be a 
serious impediment to broadband investment and innovation in today’s multi-
platform broadband IP environment, which is why the Commission has 
categorically rejected applying those rules to cable, wireline and wireless 
broadband providers. 
Letter to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, 3-4 n.11 (Feb. 22, 2010), 
http://netcompetition.org/Julius_Genachowski-Letter.pdf.  
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classifications mutually exclusive.80 Therefore, a communication that is part 
information service but uses a telecommunications component should be 
regulated as a whole in one category, not split and regulated under both 
categories.81   
Considering the text of the Act itself, the FCC concluded that the 
Internet does employ a telecommunications component, simply because it 
is necessary for an Internet access service to transport data between 
computers to provide access to the Internet.82 The Internet, however, is 
classified as an information service because it “offers end users information 
service capabilities inextricably intertwined with data transport.”83 In other 
words, although the Internet uses telecommunications to transport the 
information, Internet access is considered an information service because 
consumers use the telecommunications component solely to access 
information on the Internet. In 2005, the FCC employed this very analysis 
to argue that cable modem services were properly classified as information 
services pursuant to its 2002 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling.84 In Brand X 
Internet Services, the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s classification of 
cable modem service as an information service.85 In response, the FCC then 
formally classified the remaining broadband services as information 
services.86  
In sum, no part of broadband Internet access has ever been regulated as a 
telecommunications service even though Internet access has a 
                                                                                                                                      
 80. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,520 para. 39.  
 81. Id.   
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 11,539-40 para. 80. In this Universal Service Report, the FCC stated that  
[t]he provision of Internet access service involves data transport elements: 
an Internet access provider must enable the movement of information between 
customers’ own computers and the distant computers with which those 
customers seek to interact. But the provision of Internet access service crucially 
involves information-processing elements as well; it offers end users 
information-service capabilities inextricably intertwined with data transport. 
Id. 
 84. In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling]. 
 85. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) 
(giving great deference to the FCC’s interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934 as 
amended in 1996). 
 86. Letter from Robert M. McDowell to Henry A. Waxman, supra note 65, at 3 (stating 
that “the Commission without dissent issued a series of orders classifying all broadband 
services as information services: wireline (2005), powerline (2006) and wireless (2007)”). 
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telecommunications component. Rather, the FCC has interpreted the 
Communications Act and the Telecommunications Act to mean that 
broadband Internet access should be regulated as an information service, 
subject only to the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction under Title I.87 
III.  THE FCC’S PROBLEM—REGULATING INTERNET ACCESS 
A.  Comcast Corp. v. FCC 
Until Comcast Corp. v. FCC in 2010, the FCC exercised its ancillary 
authority to regulate Internet Service Providers (ISPs) under Title I of the 
Communications Act.88 This case challenged the FCC’s understanding of its 
ancillary jurisdiction. To understand why the FCC is considering 
reclassifying broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service, 
Comcast Corp. must be fully analyzed.  
1.  Background to Comcast Corp. v. FCC 
The dispute that gave rise to the lawsuit started in 2007, when Comcast’s 
customers were confronted with the problem of using BitTorrent.89 
BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer Internet application that allows for faster 
Internet data sharing.90 To understand how peer-to-peer file sharing 
operates, it is imperative to have a basic understanding of the mechanics of 
the Internet. The following describes the inter-workings of the Internet:  
The Internet uses “packet switched” communications in 
which information exchanged between two computers is broken 
into multiple packets of data, which are transmitted 
individually—but not necessarily by the same route—to their 
destination. At the destination, the data packets are reassembled 
into their original order. There is no need for an exclusive path 
between the two endpoints. 
                                                                                                                                      
 87. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 989.  
 88. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 12, at para. 1.  
 89. Brief for Respondents at 8, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(No. 08-1291), 2009 WL 3557928. BitTorrent allows users to share files such as music, 
movies, and photographs over the Internet. 
 90. Id. at 8-9. (“Peer-to-peer networking supports the Internet-based distribution of 
video programming . . . Peer-to-peer technology can also support other applications, 
including the provision of voice service. Skype, for example, uses peer-to-peer applications in 
its Internet-based voice communications business.”). 
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 The creation and transmission of data packets are governed by 
standardized rules, called protocols, the most common of which 
is the Transmission Control Protocol or TCP, which 
continuously monitors the user’s connection to ensure that 
packets are delivered without error and in the correct sequence. 
Under TCP, if the computer at either end of the communications 
link detects a problem in the connection, it sends a reset or RST 
packet, which signals that the current connection should be 
terminated and a new one established.91  
Peer-to-peer file sharing, such as BitTorrent, differs greatly from 
traditional methods of sharing data.92 Under the traditional method, “a 
complete copy of a content file (such as a song or a feature-length movie) is 
stored on servers and distributed from there to end users that request it.”93 
With peer-to-peer file sharing, the files are disassembled into small pieces, 
sent to be stored on different end users’ computers, and can be accessed by 
multiple computers.94 For example, when a person downloads a movie 
through BitTorrent, different parts of the movie are received at the same 
time from other BitTorrent users that have the same movie.95 Thus, an 
Internet user that downloads a movie from the Internet using BitTorrent 
actually downloads pieces of the requested movie from many other Internet 
users’ computers. The consequence of BitTorrent and peer-to-peer file-
sharing is that end users’ computers become servers for these files that are 
requested through the file-sharing application.96 This type of file-sharing 
ameliorates the need to have substantial amounts of holding space for large 
amounts of data being requested at once, and it helps to alleviate “the 
upload chokepoint that would occur if one user attempted to send a large 
file to another user.”97 
In 2007, it was alleged that Comcast was interfering with its customers’ 
BitTorrent applications.98 Later, Comcast admitted to interfering with 
                                                                                                                                      
 91. Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted); see also In re Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. 
Knowledge, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, para. 3 (2008) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 92. Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, supra note 10, at 73-74. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 10; Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, supra 
note 10, at 74. 
 95. Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 10. 
 96. Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, supra note 10, at 74. 
 97. Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 10. 
 98. Id. at 11. 
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BitTorrent file-sharing because of the congestion it caused on Comcast’s 
network.99 This interference was effectuated by using “deep packet 
inspection,”100 which targets individual packets of information to determine 
whether the packet is using BitTorrent technology.101 If Comcast 
determined that a packet was using BitTorrent, it sent an RST packet102 that 
effectively terminated the connection, thus making the end user find 
another source for the requested information.103 Comcast first claimed to 
take this action only to help ameliorate network congestion during high 
Internet-usage periods, but later admitted to interfering at all times of the 
day.104 
After several complaints, the FCC intervened to enjoin Comcast’s 
interference with peer-to-peer file-sharing over the Internet.105 The FCC 
                                                                                                                                      
 99. Reply Brief for Petitioner Comcast Corp. at 3 n.1, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 
642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-1291), 2009 WL 3557932. In its brief, Comcast argued that 
“these practices were designed in good faith to manage high volumes of traffic to ensure that 
all customers could use and enjoy their High-Speed Internet services.” Id. “In particular, the 
contested practices affected less than 10% of peer-to-peer uploads (without affecting any 
downloads), and any delay lasted less than one minute in 80% of cases. Comcast also 
comprehensively disclosed the practices to customers by January 2008.” Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 100. Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 11. 
 101. Id. at 11-12. 
 102. When information is exchanged between computers, Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) continually monitors the exchange to ensure that the information is 
exchanged in the correct sequence and without error. If the computer detects an error at 
either end of the exchange, it sends an RST packet (reset packet) to terminate the exchange. 
Id. at 9-10.  
 103. Id. In its brief, the FCC stated that 
[i]n some cases, particularly involving material that is not popular (and thus 
not located on many users’ computers), the information may not be available 
elsewhere, in which case the requesting user—who could be a customer of 
Comcast or another service provider—is effectively disabled from downloading 
the information. In other cases, the material may be available on another 
computer using a service provider that does not block uploads. The latter 
outcome can both delay the customer’s receipt of the data and shift traffic from 
Comcast’s network to the non-blocking service provider’s network. 
Id. at 11-12. 
 104. Id. at 13. 
 105. Id. at 15-17; see also Complaint, supra note 91. 
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claimed jurisdiction106 over Comcast pursuant to the congressional intent 
stated in the opening paragraph of the Communications Act,107 the ancillary 
jurisdiction provision within the statute,108 and Congress’s Internet policy 
statement.109 After the FCC contacted and proceeded against Comcast 
regarding its network practices involving BitTorrent, Comcast ceased its 
interfering behavior.110 To ensure that Comcast did indeed stop interfering, 
the FCC ordered111 Comcast to submit a report to the FCC describing 
Comcast’s old network practices and a description of the new planned 
procedures.112 Soon after receiving the order, Comcast challenged it in 
federal court.113 
2.  The Appeals Court’s Determination 
Pursuant to the Communications Act, courts have developed a two-part 
test to determine whether the FCC has jurisdiction to regulate information 
services.114  The FCC may regulate “only when two conditions are satisfied: 
(1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the 
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations 
are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its 
statutorily mandated responsibilities.”115 Under the first prong of the test, 
Comcast conceded that its Internet service was well within Title I’s 
requirement116 of “interstate and foreign commerce in communication by 
                                                                                                                                      
 106. This jurisdiction was found in the FCC’s ancillary authority granted by Congress 
under Title I of the Communications Act. Because Internet access is an information service, 
it is not subject to common carrier regulation found in Title II of the Act. 
 107. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); see also Complaint, supra 
note 91, at para. 16. 
 108. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i); see also Complaint, supra note 91, at para. 15.  
 109. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). “The Commission found in particular that Comcast’s practices 
present both a ‘risk to the open nature of the Internet’—in violation of federal Internet 
policies that favor maximum customer choice of Internet content and applications—and a 
‘danger of network management practices being used to further anticompetitive ends.’” Brief 
for Respondents, supra note 89, at 14; see also Complaint, supra note 91, at para. 13. 
 110. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 111. Complaint, supra note 91, at para. 54. 
 112. Id.; Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 17-18. 
 113. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 645.  
 114. Id. at 646.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
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wire.”117 The main issue, then, was whether the FCC’s regulations fell within 
the authority granted to it by Congress.118 
The FCC argued that its regulations were ancillary to the authority 
delegated to it by Congress under sections 230(b), 151, and 4(i) of the 
Communications Act.119 First, the FCC argued that Comcast’s 
discriminatory practice of interfering with BitTorrent file-sharing frustrated 
Congress’s Internet policy stated in section 230(b) of the Act.120 That 
portion states that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to promote the 
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
services.”121 Second, the FCC argued that Comcast’s practices violated the 
very reason for creating the FCC—to regulate interstate communication by 
wire or radio, to make it available to everyone in the United States without 
discrimination.122 Third, the FCC further argued that under section 4(i) of 
the Act, Congress delegated it the authority to make the necessary 
regulation involved in this case.123  
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected each of these arguments, 
concluding that the regulatory provisions were rooted only in congressional 
policy, not in an individual grant of authority.124 After analyzing four 
previous cases, the court stated “that policy statements alone cannot 
provide the basis for the Commission’s exercise of ancillary authority—
derives from the ‘axiomatic’ principle that ‘administrative agencies may 
[act] only pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress.’”125 
Although policy statements provide insight into the mind of Congress, 
policy statements cannot be said to be delegations of authority.126 
Furthermore, the Court found that the FCC’s interpretation of its ancillary 
authority in Section 4(i) would leave the FCC “virtually free . . . from its 
                                                                                                                                      
 117. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).  
 118. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 647.  
 119. Id. 651-55.  
 120. Id. at 651-52 (arguing that such discriminatory practices did not promote the 
development of the Internet and interactive computer services).  
 121. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1). 
 122. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 651-52; see also 47 U.S.C. § 151.  
 123. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 655. “The Commission may perform any and all acts, 
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as 
may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). 
 124. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 654. 
 125. Id. at 654 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 126. Id. 
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congressional tether” and “unbounded.”127 Therefore, unless a policy 
statement is coupled with an individual grant of power, the FCC does not 
have jurisdiction to regulate an information service.128 
The FCC also argued that sections 706 and 256 are grants of authority 
from which the FCC could regulate.129 Even though sections 706130 and 
256131 may offer grants of authority, the court rejected the FCC’s argument 
because the FCC had previously determined that those sections do “not 
constitute an independent grant . . . of authority to employ other regulating 
methods.”132 Therefore, the court determined that the FCC would be bound 
                                                                                                                                      
 127. Id. at 655. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 658-60.  
 130. Section 706 states the following:  
The Commission . . . shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and 
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . by 
utilizing . . . price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that 
promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other 
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.  
Communications Act of 1934 § 706, 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006). 
 131. Section 256 states in pertinent part: 
In carrying out the purposes of this section, the Commission— 
[s]hall establish procedures for Commission oversight of coordinated 
network planning by telecommunications carriers and other providers of 
telecommunications service for the effective and efficient interconnection of 
public telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications 
service. . . .  
. . . .  
Nothing in this section shall be construed as expanding or limiting any 
authority that the Commission may have under law.  
47 U.S.C. § 256(b)(1), (c).  
 132. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 658-59. On December 23, 2010, the FCC instituted new 
rules to regulate specific conduct of Internet access providers through section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. 
Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, para. 117 (2010). The Commission reasoned that section 706 
gives express authority to “encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications 
capability by any of the means listed in the provision,” which includes broadband Internet 
access. Id. at para. 119. Although it is unclear whether this section is actually an independent 
grant of authority that the FCC may use to regulate ISPs, the D.C. Circuit opined that it is 
“arguable.” See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658. The merit of the FCC’s argument pursuant to 
section 706, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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by its previous ruling that those sections were not grants of regulatory 
authority.133  
The court held that although Congress delegated the FCC great authority 
to regulate communications by wire, Congress did not delegate unbounded 
power.134 Because the FCC failed to tether any of the policy statements in 
the Act to individual grants of authority, the court held that the FCC did 
not have the jurisdiction to impose such regulation on Comcast.135 
B.  The FCC’s Plan to Reclassify Broadband Internet Access as a 
Telecommunications Service 
The court’s decision confused the FCC regarding its jurisdictional reach 
to regulate information services pursuant to its ancillary authority.136 Prior 
to this decision, the FCC believed that it had sufficient authority to regulate 
information services so long as the regulation fell within Congress’s policy 
goals.137 Pursuant to its ancillary authority found in section 4(i), the FCC 
believed it could institute the necessary regulations.138 Comcast caused the 
FCC to question its understanding of its ancillary authority.139 Following 
that case, the FCC immediately sent out a Notice of Inquiry140 asking for 
public comment regarding the FCC’s jurisdiction and what policy changes 
it could effectuate to have more regulatory authority over similar future 
practices.141 The FCC’s general counsel, Austin Schlick, believes that the 
Comcast decision will only foster more litigation and uncertainty regarding 
the FCC’s ancillary authority.142 In its first step towards implementing 
regulation, the FCC invited public comment on the issue of reclassifying 
broadband Internet access from an information service to a 
telecommunications service.143  
                                                                                                                                      
 133. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658. 
 134. Id. at 661. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 12, at para. 1.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. New Proposal to Reclassify Broadband Services as Telecommunications Services Issued 
by US Federal Communications Commission, MAYERBROWN.COM (May 7, 2010), 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=8957&nid=6.  
 142. Id. 
 143. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 12.  
2011] RECLASSIFYING BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS 155 
 
 
In this Notice of Inquiry, the FCC sought comment on three specific 
issues:  
First, we ask whether the current information service 
classification of broadband Internet service can still support 
effective performance of the Commission’s core responsibilities. 
Second, we ask for comment on the legal and practical 
consequences of classifying the Internet connectivity component 
of broadband Internet service as a “telecommunications service” 
to which the full weight of Title II requirements would apply, 
and whether such a classification would accurately reflect the 
current market facts. Finally, we identify and invite comment on 
a third way, under which the Commission would classify the 
Internet connectivity portion of broadband Internet service as a 
telecommunications service but would simultaneously forbear, 
using the section 10 authority Congress delegated to us, from all 
but a small handful of provisions.”144 
To be sure, the FCC expressly stated that it would not consider the issues 
of regulating Internet applications or the content of the Internet.145 
Furthermore, it is also not concerned with Internet facilities or services such 
as the “Internet backbone, content delivery networks (CDNs), over-the-top 
video services, or voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) telephony 
services.”146 Instead, the FCC sought comment on regulation over 
broadband Internet service providers, and whether it could single out and 
regulate the connectivity component of wireline broadband Internet 
providers.147 Congress did not, however, delegate the authority to the FCC 
to reclassify broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service or 
to treat it as more than one offering.148 Such a reclassification would 
frustrate Congress’s intent for the regulation of the Internet. 
                                                                                                                                      
 144. Id. at para. 28.  
 145. Id. at para. 10.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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C.  The FCC Only Has the Authority Delegated to It by Congress 
Article I of the United States Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States.”149 Congress may 
delegate its legislative authority to an agency, provided that Congress 
provides intelligible standards to regulate the delegation of power.150 Even 
though the principal purpose of intelligible standards is to ensure that 
delegations of power comport with the strictures of the Constitution, those 
standards also provide boundaries so that an agency is less likely to overstep 
its bounds or to arbitrarily exercise its authority.151  
It is a cardinal rule of administrative law that an administrative agency 
only has the specific authority delegated to it by Congress152 and may not 
act beyond its delegated powers.153 “[A]n agency’s power is no greater than 
that delegated to it by Congress.”154 If an administrative agency acts beyond 
its delegated authority, the courts are bound to hold the actions “ultra 
vires155 . . . or a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.”156 The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) states that “[t]he reviewing court 
shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right.”157 Since Congress delegates 
authority to agencies through legislation, the enabling statute establishes the 
parameters of an agency’s authority to act.158 In this case, the APA warrants 
an examination into the FCC’s plan to reclassify broadband Internet access 
to determine whether such a reclassification comports with the strictures of 
the Communications Act as amended by the Telecommunications Act. 
                                                                                                                                      
 149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 150. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).  
 151. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  
 152. Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., 
concurring).  
 153. Id.  
 154. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986). 
 155. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ultra vires” as “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of 
power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 156. Catholic Health Initiatives, 617 F.3d at 497 (Brown, J., concurring).  
 157. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006). 
 158. Catholic Health Initiatives, 617 F.3d at 497 (Brown, J., concurring).  
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IV.  CONGRESS DID NOT DELEGATE BROAD INTERNET REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY TO THE FCC 
Sixty-two years after creating the FCC and delegating it the authority to 
regulate interstate communication by wire,159 Congress passed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 with the intention of de-regulating and 
promoting competition for telecommunication and information services.160 
Although Internet service providers are not expressly mentioned as either a 
telecommunications service or an information service, the text of the 
Telecommunications Act and the legislative history reflect Congress’s desire 
to leave Internet access services open to the market, not subjecting it or any 
component thereof to Title II regulation as a common carrier.161  
A.  Congress Codified the FCC’s Computer II Regulatory Dichotomy into 
Statutory Law 
1.  Basic and Enhanced Services as Telecommunication and 
Information Services 
As discussed in Part II supra, in the 1980 Computer II proceeding, the 
FCC developed a classification scheme between basic service and enhanced 
service.162 Basic service was the transportation of information through wires 
without a change in the form or content of the information.163 On the other 
hand, enhanced service  
combines basic service with computer processing applications 
that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects 
of the subscriber’s transmitted information, or provide the 
                                                                                                                                      
 159. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).  
 160. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 161. In the 15 years since Congress passed this Act, the FCC has stated time and again 
that its interpretation of the 1996 Act leads it to the conclusion that broadband Internet 
access providers are information services. It does appear, however, that the FCC believes that 
Congress left it with unprecedented authority to decide how to classify Internet access. This 
Note proposes that Congress intended Internet access to be an information service and that 
the entire service delivered to the public should be regulated as an information service, not 
split into two parts.  
 162. See Computer II, supra note 49, at 387 para. 5. 
 163. Id. at 420 para. 96.  
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subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or 
involve subscriber interaction with stored information.164     
The Telecommunications Act mirrors this paradigm, codifying 
Congress’s intention that the classifications be the same. The Act provides 
that telecommunications is the transmission of information that does not 
manipulate its form or content but delivers the information in its original 
form.165 This definition not only mirrors the FCC’s definition of basic 
service in Computer II, but also is the same characterization: a transmission 
without a change in the form or content of the information.166 On the other 
side of the dichotomy, an information service, while utilizing a 
telecommunications component to transport the information, does 
manipulate the information transmitted.167 The two definitions—
information and enhanced services—both include services having the 
capability to process information and then transmit it in a different form or 
with different content.168 Therefore, when Congress enacted the 
Telecommunications Act, it used different terms to define virtually the 
exact same dichotomy previously developed by the FCC.  
The Act’s legislative history provides evidence that Congress specifically 
intended to build upon the old Computer II framework, making the old 
basic and enhanced services into their modern-day counterpart: 
telecommunication and information services, respectively. Before enacting 
the 1996 Act, a House of Representatives report stated that it relied on a 
1983 Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) for its definition of 
                                                                                                                                      
 164. Id. at 387 para. 5.  
 165. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006) (“The term 
‘telecommunications’ means the transmission between or among points specified by the 
user, or information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the 
information as sent and received.”). 
 166. Id.   
 167. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20). An “information service” is defined as  
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, 
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include 
any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a 
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications 
service. 
Id. 
 168. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), with 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2010) (demonstrating that 
both definitions require capability of processing information and interacting with the 
subscriber). 
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telecommunication and information services.169 In a settlement agreement 
(known as the MFJ) between the Department of Justice and AT&T and its 
affiliates, the District Court for the District of Columbia listed terms and 
definitions that it used throughout the opinion in approving the 
settlement.170 In this MFJ, the court defined the terms 
“telecommunications” and “information service,” giving the terms the 
definition that Congress later codified in the Telecommunications Act, 
word for word.171 In its opinion, the court expressly stated that Computer 
II’s enhanced service is the equivalent to information services used by the 
court in the settlement agreement.172 Likewise, in a Senate committee report 
in 1995, the Senate expressly stated that an information service is “similar to 
the FCC’s definition of ‘enhanced services.’”173  
When Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act, many 
information services had been operating without Title II regulation under 
the Computer II framework, which had existed for sixteen years.174 Congress 
was well-aware of this dichotomy and could have expressly altered the 
previous framework, but there is no mention of any such intent anywhere 
in the congressional record. Congress’s awareness of the dichotomy is 
exhibited by the House report that expressly stated that the definitions in 
the House bill were based on the definitions provided in the MFJ.175 
Furthermore, the Senate committee report conclusively conveyed its 
knowledge that the term “information service” set forth in its bill, which 
eventually became law, was “similar to the FCC definition of ‘enhanced 
services.’”176 Surely Congress would understand the ramifications of its 
decision to use those definitions and not expressly state its intent to regulate 
information services. By stating its awareness of the previous classification 
system and not expressly providing for any change, it is evident that 
Congress intended to incorporate the FCC’s existing regulatory framework 
                                                                                                                                      
 169. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 125 (1995). 
 170. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 229 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 178 n.198. 
 173. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 18 (1995). 
 174. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,524 para. 45. 
 175. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 125. 
 176. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 18. 
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established in 1980.177 Before the Act was passed, the FCC could have 
instituted proceedings to change its classification scheme upon a showing 
that was not arbitrary or capricious,178 but once Congress codified into law 
the FCC’s dichotomy, it became set in stone until Congress changes course 
via new legislation.179  
This conclusion should not come as a shock by any means. Just after 
passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC sought public comment on whether 
Congress had codified the previous dichotomy between enhanced service 
and basic service.180 “Virtually all parties that commented on this issue agree 
that the statutory term ‘information services’ encompasses all activities that 
fall within the Commission’s definition of ‘enhanced services.’”181 From the 
inception of this Act, it is commonly believed by most that Congress indeed 
incorporated the FCC’s classification system into statutory law.182 
Under the Computer II framework, basic services were regulated in 
accordance with Title II of the Communications Act, and enhanced services 
were exempt because the FCC believed regulating enhanced services would 
stifle innovation.183 Only basic services were subject to regulation.184 By 
using the MFJ definitions that built upon the Computer II terms, Congress 
                                                                                                                                      
 177. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,519 para. 37 (citing Letter from 
Senator McCain at 1). Senator McCain urged that 
in defining ‘telecommunications,’ ‘telecommunications service’ and 
‘information service,’ Congress ‘distinguished between information services 
and telecommunication services to reflect the distinction set forth on the 
Modification of Final Judgment and the Commission’s Second Computer 
Inquiry proceeding between those services that offer pure transmission capacity 
and others that somehow enhance the transmission capacity.’ An information 
service, he continues, ‘is the offering of particular capabilities via 
telecommunications, but is itself not telecommunications or a 
telecommunications service. 
Id. 
 178. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).  
 179. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).  
 180. In re Implementation of the Non-accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 11 FCC Rcd. 21,905, 21,954 para. 99 (1997). 
 181. Id. at 21,954 para. 100. The FCC further declared, however, that all enhanced 
services are information services, but not all information services are enhanced services. 
Information services should be interpreted more broadly. Id. at 21,956 para. 103. 
 182. Id. at 21,954 para. 100. 
 183. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,513 para. 26. 
 184. See id. at 11,521-14 paras. 22-28. 
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must have intended for information services—the modern-day counterpart 
to enhanced services—to be exempt from Title II regulation also. 
2.  Information and Telecommunication Services as Mutually Exclusive 
Not only did Congress intend to treat information services as the 
previous enhanced service classification, but it intended that information 
and telecommunications services be mutually exclusive. First, the FCC 
expressly stated in Computer II that it would not regulate enhanced services 
under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, but that it would 
regulate basic services.185 Thus, enhanced services were mutually exclusive 
to basic services.186 A particular service was regulated only as one or the 
other. Second, in Computer II, the FCC determined that even though 
enhanced services might use both a communications service and a data 
processing component, it would be considered an enhanced service 
nonetheless.187   
In the Act, Congress codified this idea in the definition of an information 
service—a capability that is offered via telecommunications.188  Even though 
an information service has a telecommunications component, it is still 
considered an information service.189 From the definition provided in the 
Act, it is clear that the transmission of information chosen by the user 
without a change in the form or content of the information is a 
telecommunications service.190 It becomes an information service, however, 
when the service offers the capability to store, transform, and process 
information simply by using a telecommunications component.191 Thus, a 
particular service is either one that does not change the chosen content or 
form of the information (telecommunications service), or it is a service that 
has capabilities to store, transform, and process information using a 
telecommunications component (an information service).192 The Supreme 
Court affirmed this mutually exclusive classification as being consistent 
with the Communications Act as amended by the Telecommunications 
                                                                                                                                      
 185. Computer II, supra note 49, at 435 para. 132.  
 186. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2010). 
 187. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,513 para. 27. 
 188. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).  
 189. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,520 para. 39. 
 190. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43), (46). 
 191. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,521 para. 41.  
 192. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(43), (46) with 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).  
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Act.193 Therefore, the text and history of the classification framework 
support the proposition that the two classifications are mutually exclusive. 
This is consistent with the legislative history of the Telecommunications 
Act. The intent of both the House and the Senate bills indicates that 
Congress intended telecommunication and information services to be 
mutually exclusive. The House of Representatives’s bill stated that a 
“telecommunications service . . . does not include an information 
service.”194 In a committee report, the Senate declared that the definition of 
telecommunications “excludes those services . . . that are defined as 
information services.”195 In the same report, the Senate reasoned that 
“[i]nformation service providers do not ‘provide’ telecommunications 
services; they are users of telecommunications services. The definition of 
telecommunications service specifically excludes the offering of information 
services (as opposed to the transmission of such services for a fee) precisely 
to avoid imposing common carrier obligations on information service 
providers.”196 Thus, both chambers of Congress specifically intended that 
each service was mutually exclusive from the other. A service may be 
regulated as either service according to its nature, but may not be regulated 
as both.  
Congress, knowing the FCC’s history of not regulating enhanced 
services, intentionally codified the same regulatory framework in the 
Telecommunications Act. Both chambers of Congress manifested their 
desire to have mutually exclusive categories of services, even though an 
information service may have a telecommunications component.  
3.  Congress’s Intent 
This interpretation is consistent with Congress’s express intent in 
enacting the Telecommunications Act—to promote competition and 
deregulation for new telecommunications technologies.197 The Senate bill 
stated that its purpose was “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory 
national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector 
deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies 
                                                                                                                                      
 193. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973-77 
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and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to 
competition . . . .”198 Likewise, the House stated that its goal was also to 
promote competition and “reduce regulation.”199 These policy statements 
are important for two reasons. First, these were the same reasons employed 
by the FCC in 1980 in Computer II when it decided not to regulate 
enhanced services.200 The FCC thought that Title II regulation would harm 
innovation and competition.201 Congress, in 1995, had the same policy 
considerations as the FCC had in 1980 evidencing that Congress intended 
to maintain the FCC’s deregulatory policies and even wrote them into 
statutory law in the 1996 Act. Second, if Congress indeed did intend to 
change course and submit information services or enhanced services to 
common carrier regulation, Congress’s policy to promote de-regulation and 
competition would not have lined up with its intent. Up until this time, 
information services had been basically free of regulation and had seen 
great improvements and innovation due to competition.202 Congress must 
have intended to continue the FCC’s path of de-regulation to meet its goals. 
B.  Congress Intended for Internet Access Services to be Information Services 
In the Telecommunications Act, Congress did not explicitly state that 
Internet access services were information services. It is apparent, however, 
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that Congress contemplated the Internet when it enacted the Act.203 Senator 
McCain urged that “[i]t certainly was not Congress’s intent in enacting the 
supposedly pro-competitive, deregulatory 1996 Act to extend the burdens of 
current Title II regulation to Internet services, which historically have been 
excluded from regulation.”204 This sentiment was echoed by “Senators 
Ashcroft, Ford, John F. Kerry, Abraham and Wyden emphasiz[ing] that 
nothing in the 1996 Act or its legislative history suggests that Congress 
intended to alter the current classification of Internet . . . services . . . .”205 
1.  The Text of the Telecommunications Act 
Broadband Internet access fits squarely within the definition of an 
information service. As Justice Thomas argued: 
A user cannot reach a third party’s Web site without DNS, which 
(among other things) matches the Web site address the end user 
types into his browser . . . with the IP address of the Web page’s 
host server. []For an internet user, “DNS is a must. . . . [N]early 
all of the Internet’s network services use DNS. That includes the 
World Wide Web, electronic mail, remote terminal access, and 
file transfer”[]. . . . Similarly, the Internet service provided by 
cable companies facilitates access to third-party Web pages by 
offering consumers the ability to store, or “cache,” popular 
content on local computer servers. . . . In other words, 
subscribers can reach third-party Web sites via “the World Wide 
Web, and browse their contents, only because their service 
provider offers the ‘capability for . . . acquiring, [storing] . . .  
retrieving [and] utilizing . . . information.’” “The service that 
Internet access providers offer to members of the public is 
Internet access,” not a transparent ability (from the end user’s 
perspective) to transmit information.206 
This has not changed since it was stated by Justice Thomas in 2005 and 
reaffirmed by the FCC in 2007.207 Broadband providers today provide even 
                                                                                                                                      
 203. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b). 
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more functionalities than before. These added functionalities include 
“security screening, spam protection, anti-virus and anti-botnet 
technologies, pop-up blockers, parental controls, online email and photo 
storage, instant messaging, and the ability to create a customized 
browser . . . .”208 From the user’s perspective, broadband Internet access 
providers offer much more than a pure transmission, but instead offer a 
completely integrated offering of access to the Internet along with other 
features. Accordingly, broadband Internet access providers are properly 
classified as information services, fitting within the definition prescribed by 
Congress. 
Although the text of the Act does not explicitly state that ISPs are 
information services, the language certainly implies it. Section 230 of the 
Telecommunications Act, also known as the Communications Decency Act 
of 1996,209 evidences Congress’s intent to consider ISPs as information 
services.210 This section immunized providers and users of interactive 
computer services from restricting access in good faith to “material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material 
is constitutionally protected.”211 Furthermore, it immunized ISPs from 
liability stemming from access services provided to content providers of 
obscene material.212  
Within the definitions provided in this section, “Interactive computer 
service” is defined as “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides 
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by 
libraries or educational institutions.”213 First, it is notable that the definition 
limits the criteria to information services, systems, or access software 
providers, with no mention of telecommunications services.214 Second, it 
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recognizes that information services provide “access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides 
access to the Internet . . . .”215 This definition describes precisely what ISPs 
do—provide access to servers and the Internet. If ISPs were to be treated as 
telecommunications services, then this section would have no bearing on 
what it purports to regulate. At the very least, it seems incredible that 
Congress would intend for ISPs to be considered information services for 
purposes of section 230, but for every other purpose, allow the FCC to 
decide how to define ISPs. This would only foster confusion and litigation. 
Furthermore, if Congress intended to have ISPs be defined as 
telecommunications services, Congress surely would have included 
telecommunications services within the definition of interactive computer 
services, or Congress may have included interactive computer services 
within the definition of telecommunication services or common carriers.  
Courts have found section 230 to encompass ISPs as information 
services. In America Online, Inc. v. Greatdeals.net, America Online, Inc. 
(AOL), formerly one of the largest ISPs in the United States, brought suit 
against Martindale Empowerment to enjoin it from sending unsolicited, 
bulk email advertisements to AOL’s customers.216 Under the definition of 
interactive computer service in section 230 of the Telecommunications Act, 
the court found that AOL, as an Internet provider, was properly classified as 
an information service and should not be regulated under the anti-
discriminatory provisions relating to common carriers.217 Although the 
court deferred to the FCC’s interpretation of the statute, the court found 
that it was a reasonable interpretation with much support in the text of the 
statute.218 The court stated that “[i]f Congress had intended to include 
interactive computer services or information service providers like AOL in 
the definition of common carrier, it would have so indicated.”219 Therefore, 
AOL was considered an information service not subject to regulation under 
Title II of the Act.220  
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 217. Id. at 855-57. 
 218. Id. at 856. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 855-57. 
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2.  Congress’s Stated Policy in the Act  
In the congressional findings and policy provided in the Act, Congress 
clearly manifested its intent to shelter the Internet and Internet providers 
from regulation. First, Congress made a number of findings that it 
transcribed in the Act:  
The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive 
computer services available to individual Americans represent an 
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and 
informational resources . . . .  
. . . . 
The Internet and other interactive computer services have 
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of 
government regulation.221  
Congress specifically recognized that up until this point, the Internet and 
Internet providers were subject to only minimal government regulation.222 
Not only were they subject to minimal regulation, but it “flourished”223 and 
developed rapidly under the FCC’s classification system.224  
Second, Congress stated:  
It is the policy of the United States— 
 (1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and 
other interactive computer services and other interactive media;  
 (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation . . . .225  
In reading the findings and policy statements together, it is abundantly 
clear that Congress did not institute any kind of change, but intended to 
keep the status quo. Congress intended to preserve the “vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet.”226 Congress 
was aware of the regulatory landscape at the time of the Act and expressly 
stated its intention to keep that same framework.227 Furthermore, the phrase 
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“unfettered by Federal and State regulation”228 expressly shows Congress’s 
de-regulatory Internet policy. Congress recognized the innovation and 
progress the Internet has made and intended to keep the status quo, which 
was minimal federal and state regulation. In enacting this policy in the Act, 
in essence, Congress set in stone its desire to keep the Internet and 
interactive computer services open, free from oppressive regulation.  
Some argue that the findings and policy portions of section 230 are 
merely describing the status of the Internet.229 Namely, that Congress found 
that only the Internet—not ISPs—was free from federal or state 
regulation.230 This finding, however, not only states that the Internet has 
flourished due to minimal governmental regulation, but also that interactive 
computer services have flourished as well.231 Again, interactive computer 
services are defined as information services that provide access to server 
computers or the Internet—ISPs232 Even courts have interpreted that 
definition as including ISPs.233 In the policy section of 230, interactive 
computer services are included along with the Internet—evidencing 
Congress’s intent that the present non-regulatory landscape should remain 
the same. Therefore, section 230 applies to the Internet as well as ISPs.  
Even if the congressional intent in the Act is unclear, Congress’s silence 
evidences its approval of the FCC’s policies of not classifying any part of 
broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service. “When an 
agency adheres consistently to a particular view of statutory meaning, and 
Congress is aware of the agency’s interpretation and takes no action to 
correct it, Congress’s inaction is persuasive evidence that the interpretation 
is the one intended by Congress.”234 In the FCC’s 1998 report to Congress, 
the FCC made expressly clear that it would not regulate Internet access 
providers as common carriers under Title II.235 The FCC continued this 
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course in 2002, 2005, 2006, and 2007 as it formally classified all types of 
broadband Internet services as information services.236 Furthermore, the 
FCC always classified the entire broadband Internet service as an 
information service, never singling out a telecommunications service that 
may have some part in the offering of the information service.237 Since these 
determinations, “Congress has never signaled disapproval of the 
Commission’s current statutory interpretation or taken any action to 
overturn it—a strong indicator that the Commission’s approach thus far has 
been the one intended by Congress.”238  
Congress’s and the FCC’s non-regulatory policies have proved to be 
successful. In an argument against Internet neutrality, AT&T Corporation 
explained that the 
market [is] competitive . . . wireless broadband Internet access 
has become a vibrant part of the marketplace and a true 
competitive threat, serving as an alternative for a host of wireline 
broadband applications. And beyond the mere number of 
competitors, many other factors demonstrate the 
competitiveness of the marketplace. There are more applications 
and content providers than ever before, some of which have 
customer bases many times the size of any broadband provider’s 
customer base; broadband penetration figures continue to climb; 
broadband speeds are rising; and broadband prices are 
dropping.239  
The general consensus is that minimal Internet regulation promotes the 
most competition and innovation.240 That is why Congress specifically 
provided to maintain the same regulatory framework. As the FCC has 
maintained for over 10 years since the Telecommunications Act was 
enacted, broadband Internet access is properly classified as a whole as an 
information service exempt from any regulation under Title II.241 The FCC 
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believed this interpretation was “entirely consistent, both internally and 
with the letter and spirit of the Act.”242 Not only is it consistent “with the 
letter and spirit of the Act,” but it is mandatory as set forth by Congress in 
the Telecommunications Act.  
C.  Congress Did Not Intend for Facilities-Based ISPs to “Unbundle” Their 
Service 
The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry contemplates thrusting Computer II’s 
“unbundling” requirements on the Internet connectivity component of 
facilities-based ISPs, but still treats Internet access as an information 
service.243 Under this scheme, the FCC would regulate only the underlying 
telecommunications component that actually transports the information 
the ISPs offer to their customers and would treat the Internet connectivity 
component as a common carrier offering under Title II.244 Thus, only ISPs 
that own their own facilities (facilities-based providers) would be subject to 
regulation.245 Among other requirements, ISPs would be required to lease 
their lines on a common carrier basis to competitors on the same terms and 
conditions as their own offering.246  
Under the Computer Inquiry proceedings, the FCC treated facilities-
based providers differently from non-facilities-based providers.247 Pursuat 
to the FCC’s regulations, enhanced service providers that owned their own 
lines were required to lease those lines to competitors.248 This practice 
mitigated the risk of one provider having a monopoly over all the wires 
used to provide the enhanced service.249 Therefore, the FCC was able to 
promote competition in a world that depended on telephone wires to 
transport information.250  
Even though Congress intended to incorporate the FCC’s dichotomy 
between enhanced and basic services into the Telecommunications Act as 
discussed above, it does not follow that every FCC policy dealing with those 
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services was incorporated.251 There is no grant of authority within the Act 
signaling Congress’s intent to single out any one offering and subject that 
offering to Title II regulation as a common carrier. Justice Thomas argued,  
In the Computer II rules, the Commission subjected facilities-
based providers to common-carrier duties not because of the 
nature of the “offering” made by those carriers, but rather 
because of the concern that local telephone companies would 
abuse the monopoly power . . . . The differential treatment of 
facilities-based carriers was therefore a function not of the 
definitions of “enhanced-service” and “basic service,” but instead 
of a choice by the Commission to regulate more stringently, in its 
discretion, certain entities that provided enhanced service. The 
Act’s definitions, however, parallel the definitions of enhanced 
and basic service, not the facilities-based grounds on which that 
policy choice was based, and the Commission remains free to 
impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its 
Title I ancillary jurisdiction.252  
Since the FCC promulgated these rules in the 1980s, the landscape has 
changed. The threat of an enhanced service provider maintaining an unfair 
monopoly has subsided. The FCC designed these outdated, unbundling 
regulations for a world that was connected through one wire, not “today’s 
multi-platform broadband IP environment.”253 The “unbundling” rules 
prevented a single company with a monopoly from refusing other 
companies access to its wires. According to the FCC, the underlying “basic 
service is the building block upon which enhanced services are offered.”254 
Therefore, this unbundling allowed other enhanced service providers to 
offer their services using the same transmission lines. Unbundling would no 
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longer serve the same purpose because we no longer live in a one-wire 
world. In fact, a person does not even need a wire to connect to the Internet, 
and there are multiple broadband platforms in regular use. Thus, the 
original purpose for the unbundling requirement is no longer necessary, 
and this discretionary rule promulgated by the FCC during the Computer 
Inquiry proceedings should not be imputed as Congress’s intent without 
further evidence. 
Congress could not have intended to apply the unbundling requirements 
on broadband ISPs because that would defy Congress’s own policy 
statements in section 230 for the same reasons stated in Part IV(B)(2) 
supra.255 Congress favored de-regulation and intended to keep the Internet 
and ISPs free from state and federal regulation.256 Furthermore, Congress 
intended to keep the market free and competitive.257 ISPs, such as Verizon 
and AT&T (among others), fear that  
this antiquated regulatory structure would require all providers 
to divert time and resources from deploying broadband networks 
so that they can design and implement the myriad systems and 
processes necessary to comply with a bevy of newly imposed 
Title II obligations and requirements. At best, this would lead to 
major market uncertainties that will hamper each company’s 
ability to raise and deploy capital efficiently. At worst, it would 
seriously undermine the value of broadband investments already 
made and disincent [sic] new ones. In either case, the Title II 
classification proposal would dampen broadband investment 
and job-producing economic growth at the worst possible 
time.258  
As Justice Thomas stated, the FCC is free to impose Title I regulations on 
the telecommunications component pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction, 
but the authority to impose Title II common carrier regulations on the 
telecommunications component is unfounded. 
Before 2010, the FCC properly interpreted the Act in accordance with 
Congress’s intent. The FCC’s official recognition of broadband Internet 
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access as one offering under the Act is a classification that even the Supreme 
Court affirmed as reasonable under Congress’s directives.259  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In 1980, the FCC formally began a practice of de-regulation in terms of 
new technologies that were classified as enhanced services. This 
classification scheme was further recognized in the Modification of Final 
Judgment by the District Court of the District of Columbia. Congress, 
having complete knowledge of the existing de-regulatory framework 
imposed by the FCC and the court, codified this structure in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. In doing so, Congress intended that 
Internet access services be afforded shelter from regulation and be 
considered an information service as one offering—not subject to 
mandatory Title II regulation. Congress did not take any action whatsoever 
to indicate it had changed the Computer II classification framework. 
Instead, Congress wrote the FCC’s dichotomy into statutory law. Any effort 
by the FCC to reclassify broadband Internet access services as a 
telecommunications service would be adverse to the power Congress 
specifically delegated to it, and therefore, a violation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Although Congress implemented the FCC’s dichotomy, 
there is no statutory authority or provision to suggest that Congress 
intended the FCC to regulate the Internet connectivity component of 
broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service. The FCC does 
not have the authority to reclassify broadband Internet access or any 
component thereof as a telecommunications service.  
In a recent gathering, the FCC’s Commissioner Michael Copps declared 
that “[o]ur [FCC’s] job now is to correct course by reclassifying broadband 
as the telecommunications service that it is—you know, actually call an 
apple an apple!”260 But to act within its congressionally delegated power, the 
FCC must wait for Congress to call it an apple. 
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